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1 Introduction
The information acquisition problem in auctions occurs when a bidder does not have a clear
idea about her exact willingness to pay for the underlying auctioned object, which can happen
in both common value auctions and private value auctions. Much work has been done on this
problem. This paper considers another type of information acquisition problem in which the
bidder knows her valuation of the auctioned object and also tries to learn the other bidders’
valuations. Thus each bidder has a bidimensional type that consists of her own valuation (the
valuation type) and the signal about her opponent’s valuation (information type).
In realistic economic activities, like auctions or procurement, and other similar situations,
bidders can have information about their own estimations of the auctioned object or project, and
also information about their opponents’ evaluations of the underlying object besides their com-
mon prior. The latter information may come from bidders’ strategic actions or from some other
parties, which helps update bidders’ beliefs on opponents. In other words, this is an environment
where bidders have multidimensional information, or multidimensional types in game theory ter-
minology. For example, in China, many middle-size and small-size state-owned enterprises have
been privatized by way of procurement in the past several years. There are usually two or three
potential buyers. The interactions between these buyers are rather involved and they may know
part of their opponents’ inside information. Another example is the NBA draft. The recruiting
competition can be compared to an auction over the top-ranked candidates by assuming that
the preferences of candidates only rely on monetary benefit. It has been observed during the
period that clubs take measures to hide their own beliefs about candidates’ values, and employ
“detectives” to investigate the confidential information on other clubs’ prices for recruiting their
desired candidate(s). We can see that a club could have multidimensional information, its own
evaluation and possibly other clubs’ evaluations of candidates in this competitive environment.
This paper tries to capture such a multidimensional information structure by way of infor-
mation acquisition1 on opponents. For independent private values, the bidder’s own valuation
does not tell her any information about other bidders’ valuations. This means the bidder can-
not update her belief based on her own valuation signal. A natural question, then, is whether
the bidder has incentives to acquire information about her opponents’ valuations. Though it is
somewhat difficult to find an example in the context of independent private value such that it
is fully consistent with this kind of information acquisition behavior, our paper makes the first
1For simplicity, we always use “information acquisition” to refer to the bidder’s acquiring information about
her opponents’ private valuations. Sometimes information acquisition is abbreviated as IA. This is different from
the meaning elsewhere in the literature. Sometimes information acquisition, information acquiring, information
collection, and collecting information are used interchangeably.
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attempt to model bidders’ bidimensional types and bidimensional strategies in a simple setting.
The auction format we mainly focus on is the first price sealed-bid auction (abbreviated
as FPA), since this sealed-bid auction has been widely used in practice, such as in auctioning
mineral rights in government-owned land, the sales of artwork and real estate as well as procure-
ment. Examples include the U.S. offshore oil and gas lease auctions, the UK Treasury securities
auctions which are the multiunit equivalent of the first-price auction (every winner pays her own
bid).2 As Klemperer (2003, pp.2) has claimed, sealed-bid designs frequently (but not always)
both attract a larger number of serious bidders and are better at deterrence of collusion than as-
cending designs, see also Klemperer (1998, 2000, 2002). Maskin and Riley (1984) show that first
price sealed-bid auction is the most profitable one amongst the standard auctions when bidders
are risk-averse. When considering bidders have outside options, Kirchkamp et al. (2008) show
that bidders in first-price auctions have more overbidding with outside options than without,
and first-price auctions yield more revenue than second-price auctions do. As for second-price
sealed-bid auctions (SPA) or Vickrey Auctions, it might be trivial to consider such a type of
information acquisition on opponents’ valuations because opponents’ signals do not play any role
in the formulation of strategies in SPA. All these reasons lead us to consider first price auctions.
In our paper, the bidder can covertly incur a cost to achieve a noisy signal conveying infor-
mation about her opponents’ valuations. We assume neither the bidder’s information acquisition
choice nor the signal received by the bidder can be observed by other bidders. For simplicity,
the accuracy of the signal and the cost of the signal are exogenously determined. In our pri-
vate value auction model, we analyze only the two-bidder case, where each bidder’s valuation
of the auctioned object is independently drawn from an identical distribution that has only two
possible values.
We consider two different specifications of the environments: the ex ante information acquisi-
tion setting where bidders invest in opponents’ valuations before observing their own valuations
and the interim information acquisition setting where bidders invest in opponents’ valuations
after observing their own valuations. This is because both the interim and ex-ante information
acquisitions are equally interesting in daily economic activities. In some case one can obtain
information about one’s opponents prior to or when evaluating her own strength exactly in the
competition. For example, a firm needs to know about the incumbents of the market when it
considers entering that industry. In some case one may intentionally get to know his or her com-
petitors, namely, an incumbent would like to expect other firms’ reactions when it introduces
a new round of competition since the rivals’ strategies are of particular importance. In other
2See the survey paper by Porter (1995) and footnote 14 in Klemperer (2003, chapter 1). Besides, the U.S.
Treasury auctions used to be run with the multiunit version of first price auctions too.
3
cases, one may know partial information on opponents as a byproduct with one’s own value and
then decide whether to invest in more.
Most studies of information acquisition in auctions focus on how to improve the estimate
of true valuation, since the bidder does not know her valuation when the auction begins, i.e.,
Matthews (1984) and Larson (2006) in the context of common values, Persico (2000) with affil-
iated values, Shi and Valimaki (2007) with interdependent values, Rezende (2005), Compte and
Jehiel (2007), Shi (2007) in private value settings. All these papers share the same characteristic
that bidders do not know their exact valuations at the beginning of the auction. Tan (1992)
and Arozamena and Cantillon (2004) investigate the incentives for investment before auctions,
and Hernando-Veciana (2006) considers the incentives of a bidder to acquire information in an
auction when her information acquisition decision is observed by the other bidders before they
bid.3
Our models have some similarities with that of Persico (2000), in which the bidder’s strategy
is bidimensional (consisting of the cost to induce more accurate signal and the bidding rule).
In our paper, the bidder’s strategy is also two-dimensional, namely, the bidder has freedom to
choose the probability to incur a fixed cost for receipt of a signal with certain accuracy and
specifies her bidding rules accordingly. However, the basic structures of the two papers are quite
different. Our paper also shares some common characteristics with Fang and Morris (2006).
First, both papers study the independent private value auction model where the bidder knows
exactly what her valuation is at the beginning of the auction. In addition, the costly information
acquisition behavior refers to collecting information about opponents’ valuations.
However, these two models have the following distinctions. First, in Fang and Morris’ model,
the behavior of acquiring information is exogenously given. Our paper aims to solve this problem
by endogenizing the choice of information acquisition, since in many realistic economic activities
the choice of acquiring information is part of bidders’ strategies. Secondly, there is no social
welfare loss in Fang and Morris’ binary-valuation model since no information cost is taken into
consideration. As such, the outcome is efficient from the view of social planner, which may be
regarded as “first best” outcome. However, contrary to Fang and Morris’ benchmark case, in
our model, costly information acquisition that can be regarded as an information rent leads to
deadweight loss in total social surplus, and consequently, it results in inefficient outcome, which
may be regarded as “second best” outcome4. In other words, generally information acquisition
3There is also a strand of papers studying information acquisition problem where the auctioneer has controlled
the information resources, such as Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2002) and Ganuza (2004), Eso and Szentes (2007).
Milgrom and Weber (1982) also investigate the seller’s information disclosure policy in affiliated setting.
4The equilibrium outcome in our model may be even worse than second best due to the dissipative information
cost, since it is not clear what exactly the second best outcome is.
4
involves efficiency loss and the first best outcome cannot be achieved. Thirdly, our strategy
space is two-dimensional, while in Fang and Morris’ model it is of single dimension.
The contribution of this paper is as follows. First, our model takes an initial step in endo-
genizing information acquisition on opponent’s valuations in independent private value models.
Second, in our endogenous model, both the type space and strategy space of bidders are bidi-
mensional,5 which differs from the current literature. Third, we find that costly information
acquisition leads to deadweight loss in social surplus, and therefore, the equilibrium outcome
is inefficient. This tells that the efficient outcome is generally not achievable with costly in-
formation acquisition, and the corresponding policy implication would be that the information
acquisition behavior should be prevented to maximize social welfare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic setting of
the model. Section 3 discusses bidders’ behavior when bidders can make ex ante information
acquisition choices. Section 4 considers a more relaxed environment in which bidders make
their information acquisition choices at an interim stage. Section 5 discusses the comparative
statics and implications: efficiency, surplus, and revenue across FPA and SPA formats. Section
6 discusses some variants of the model. Section 7 concludes. All the proofs are relegated to the
appendix.
2 Preliminaries
There are two risk neutral bidders indexed by i ∈ N = {1, 2} who compete for an underlying
object. The object is worth zero to the seller. Every bidder i ∈ N has a valuation vi ∈ V =
{Vl, Vh} for the object, where 0 < Vl < Vh. The valuations vi are private and independently
drawn from identical distribution. The prior distribution of bidder i’s valuation vi is given
by Pr{vi = Vl} = pl (0 < pl < 1), and Pr{vi = Vh} = ph = 1 − pl for i ∈ N . Then
v = (v1, v2) ∈ V × V is a profile of possible valuations. The auction format is the first price
sealed-bid auction. The reservation price of the seller is normalized to zero.
Each bidder i can incur an exogenous cost c(c = 0) to get a noisy signal si which induces
information about her opponent’s private valuation. If the bidder does not want to collect
information about her opponent’s valuation, she does not incur any cost and cannot receive any
signal. Let ai ∈ {1, 0} denote bidder i’s choice of acquiring information, where ai = 1 means
5In our independent private value auction model, the type of the bidder is determined by the bidder’s valuation
type and the signal received, and the strategy of the bidder includes the information acquisition choice and
bidding rule. Therefore, our model relaxes the restrictive approach of encoding multidimensional types into a
single-dimensional variable. From the point of view in general mechanism design (cf. Hurwicz (1979), Mount and
Reiter (1974), and Tian (1994, 2004, 2006)), the information smuggling of changing multi-dimensional types (say,
by the inverse Peano curve) into a single-dimensional variable is essentially equivalent to one-dimensional type
problem.
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acquiring information and ai = 0 means not.
To clearly describe the information structure, we assume neither the bidder’s information
acquisition choice nor the signal received by the bidder can be observed by her opponent.
The signal si received by bidder i is drawn from the support S = {L,H} if she acquires
information. For convenience, we denote s0 as receiving no signal, and let S¯ = {L,H, s0}.
Given bidder j’s valuation and bidder i’s IA choice, the probability of the transmitted signal si
taking on each possible value is characterized by
Pr{si = L|vj = Vl, ai = 1} = Pr{si = H|vj = Vh, ai = 1} = q,
Pr{si = s0|vj = Vl, ai = 0} = Pr{si = s0|vj = Vh, ai = 0} = 1;
(1)
for i6=j, i, j ∈ N ; note that Pr{si = L|vj = Vl, ai = 1} + Pr{si = H|vj = Vl, ai = 1} = 1
and Pr{si = H|vj = Vh, ai = 1} + Pr{si = L|vj = Vh, ai = 1} = 1. Since all the signals are
characterized by one parameter q, we call q the accuracy of the signal. Without loss of generality,
we assume 0.5 < q 5 1. Bidder j updates her belief about i’s information type si according to
the signal distribution specified by equation (1).
The auction game we will analyze is a Bayesian game of incomplete information. The
type space of each bidder is T ≡{Vl, Vh}×{L,H, s0}. One representative type of bidder i is
ti = (vi, si) ∈ T . We call vi the valuation type, and si the information type. Given bidder i’s
signal si, bidder i updates her belief on her opponent’s valuation type according to the Bayes’
rule as follows. For si ∈ {L,H}, i6=j, i, j ∈ N ,
Pr{vj = Vl|si = L} = plq
plq + ph(1− q) ,
Pr{vj = Vl|si = H} = pl(1− q)
pl(1− q) + phq ,
Pr{vj = Vl|si = s0} = pl;
(2)
and the conditional probability is also a probability distribution, i.e., Pr{vj = Vh|si} = 1 −
Pr{vj = Vl|si} for si ∈ S¯.
The primitives of the model are a tuple of five independent parameters as follows,
E =
{
< Vl, Vh, pl, q, c >: Vh > Vl > 0, pl ∈ (0, 1), q ∈ (0.5, 1], c = 0
}
.
An element e ∈ E is called an auction environment.
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3 Ex Ante Endogenous Information Acquisition
3.1 The Model
In this section we consider an auction economy in which bidders can acquire information on their
opponents’ valuations ex ante. That is, the bidder can decide whether to collect information
before knowing her own valuation.
The procedures of this auction game are as follows:
• Stage 1. Bidders simultaneously decide whether to incur a cost c to collect information on
her opponent’s valuation, and this decision is not observed by her opponent.
• Stage 2. Nature draws a valuation for each bidder and tells the bidder only what her own
valuation is. Every bidder receives a signal si revealing her opponent’s valuation if she
incurs a cost c in Stage 1. Otherwise, she receives no signal. Bidders’ signal is unobservable
for her opponent.
• Stage 3. Bidders submit their bids simultaneously based on their own valuations, and
possibly their updated belief from the signal according to (2).
• Stage 4. The bidder whose bid is the highest receives the object and pays what she bids.6
In this ex ante IA auction game, bidder has bidimensional type (valuation type and infor-
mation type) and bidimensional strategy (acquiring information choice and bidding rule). To
analyze this auction economy, we first define a set of notations.
For interested primitive values, bidders may randomize IA choice and bid submitted. Let
Fa({0, 1}) denote the collection of probability distributions defined on the set {0, 1}, and let
Fb([0, Vh]) denote the collection of probability distributions defined on the interval [0, Vh]. We
define the bidder’s (mixed) strategy as follows. The (mixed) information acquisition choice
of bidder i is one element of Fa({1, 0}), which can be simply characterized by one number
piiE = Pr{ai = 1} where 1 > piiE > 0 (note that 1 − piiE = Pr{ai = 0}). A bidding rule7 is
a mapping B 3 b : T −→ Fb([0, Vh]). The strategy space of bidder i is then characterized by
6When there is a tie, we choose the fair tie-breaking rule for q ∈ (0.5, 1) and Vickrey tie-breaking rule for
q = 1. The fair tie-breaking rule says in the tie each bidder wins the object with equal probability and pays what
she bids conditional on winning. The Vickrey tie-breaking rule is as follows: in the tie both bidders are asked to
report a number, either 0 or ²∗ where ²∗ is a sufficiently small positive number. If only one bidder reports ²∗,
then this bidder gets the object and pays her bid; else the bidders get the object with equal probability and the
bidder having the object pays her bid plus her reported number. Actually it does not matter which tie-breaking
rule is used for q < 1, we just choose the fair tie-breaking rule to explicitly and conveniently specify the strategic
form of the auction economy. For q = 1, however, the fair tie-breaking rule does not promise an equilibrium in
our auction game and the Vickrey rule will reinstall the equilibrium.
7In principle, the bid support is a subset of the real line. Without loss of generality, we focus on the bounded
support [0, Vh].
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AEi = Fa({1, 0})× B, and a typical element of AEi would be AEi = [piiE , (bi(t))t∈T ]. Note that
bi(t) represents a random variable (or equivalently a distribution) with potential support [0, Vh],
not a single bid. Then AE = AE1 ×AE2 denotes the strategy space of the auction game.
Given a strategy profile (AE1 , A
E
2 ) ∈ AE , there would be an ex ante joint distribution of the
random vector (a1, v1, b1; a2, v2, b2), Γ(a1, v1, b1; a2, v2, b2|AE1 , AE2 ) induced by (AE1 , AE2 ), here bi
refers to the bid that bidder i submits. The ex post payoff gE ≡ (gE1 , gE2 ) : {1, 0}2 × V2 ×
[0, Vh]2 −→ R2 simply takes the form as follows according to the first price auction rule
gEi (a1, v1, b1; a2, v2, b2) = (vi − bi) ·
[
1{bi > bj}+ 121{bi = bj}
]
− aic, i 6= j, i = 1, 2, (3)
where 1{·} is the indicator function. Hence, the ex ante expected payoff GE ≡ (GE1 , GE2 ) :
AE −→ R2 is given by
GEi (A
E
1 , A
E
2 ) = EΓ(·|AE1 ,AE2 )
[
gEi (a1, v1, b1; a2, v2, b2)
]
, i = 1, 2, (4)
where the expectation of gEi is taken with respect to the joint distribution of random vector
(a1, v1, b1; a2, v2, b2) induced by (AE1 , A
E
2 ).
A tuple < AE , GE > with primitive e ∈ E is then called an ex ante IA auction game.
3.2 Equilibrium
We first have the following lemma that tells type-Vl bidder bids her valuation Vl for sure in any
equilibrium.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium of the ex ante IA auction game < AE , GE >, type-(Vl, s) bidders
bid Vl in pure strategy for s ∈ {H,L, s0}.
With this lemma in hand, we establish that the equilibrium for this FPA auction game
< AE , GE > is unique and symmetric. The characterization of the equilibrium is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The ex ante IA auction game < AE , GE > with primitive e ∈ E has a unique
equilibrium. More specifically:
(i). When the informative cost is small, i.e. c < plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1), then the unique
equilibrium of the FPA is symmetric and can be described as follows. For i = 1, 2
1. With probability piE, the bidder collects information about her opponent’s private val-
uation; with probability (1− piE) the bidder does not collect information.
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2. bi(Vl, s) = Vl for s ∈ {s0, L,H}.
3. When q = 1, type-(Vh, L) bidder submits bi(Vh, L) = Vl for sure; when q < 1, type-
(Vh, L) bidder mixes over (Vl, δ1] according to the cumulative distribution function
(c.d.f) J l(·) specified by
J l(b) =
plq
piEph(1− q)2 ·
b− Vl
Vh − b , b ∈ (Vl, δ1]. (5)
4. Type-(Vh, s0) bidder mixes over [δ1, δ2] according to the c.d.f. Js0(·) specified by
Js0(b) =
pl + piE(1− q)ph
ph(1− piE) ·
b− δ1
Vh − b , b ∈ [δ1, δ2]. (6)
5. Type-(Vh,H) bidder mixes over [δ2, δ3] according to the c.d.f. Jh(·) specified by
Jh(b) =
pl(1− q) + phq(1− piEq)
piEphq2
· b− δ2
Vh − b , b ∈ [δ2, δ3]. (7)
Here
δ1 =
plqVl + piEph(1− q)2Vh
plq + piEph(1− q)2 , (8)
δ2 =
ph(1− piE)Vh + [pl + piE(1− q)ph]δ1
pl + ph(1− piEq) , (9)
δ3 =
piEphq
2Vh + [pl(1− q) + phq(1− piEq)]δ2
pl(1− q) + phq , (10)
and piE is determined by the following condition:
ph
{
plq(Vh − Vl) + [pl(1− q) + phq(1− piEq)](Vh − δ2)
}− c
=ph
[
pl + piE(1− q)ph
]
(Vh − δ1).
(11)
(ii). When c = plp2h(Vh−Vl)(2q−1), the unique equilibrium of the FPA is symmetric and can
be described as follows. For i = 1, 2
1. piiE = 0. No bidder acquires information.
2. bi(Vl, s0) = Vl.
3. Type-(Vh, s0) bidder mixes over (Vl, γ] according to the c.d.f. J¯(·) specified by
J¯(b) =
pl
ph
· b− Vl
Vh − b , b ∈ (Vl, γ], (12)
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where
γ = plVl + phVh. (13)
Remark 1 Provided that the informative cost is negligible, i.e., c = 0, the information acquisi-
tion probability piE reduces to 1, which is the same equilibrium outcome as that of the exogenous
information acquisition (Proposition 1 in Fang and Morris, 2006).
Remark 2 When q = 1, the switch of tie-breaking rule does not change the variables of interest.
For instance, the bidder’s expected surplus and seller’s revenue are continuous at q = 1. The
reason is that the equilibria are exactly the same under fair tie-breaking rule and Vickrey tie-
breaking rule for q < 1.
Remark 3 For equilibrium strategies in part (i), if piE = 0, type-(Vh, L) and type-(Vh,H) bid-
ders disappear, and the formula Js0(·) remains valid; if piE = 1, type-(Vh, s0) bidder disappears,
and the formulas J l(·) and Jh(·) remain valid.
The type of equilibrium depends on the value of the informative cost. There is information
acquisition only if the cost is small, i.e., c < plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1). In equilibrium, the bidder
with valuation Vl always bids her valuation Vl. If bidders acquire information, the type-(Vh, L),
type-(Vh, s0) and type-(Vh,H) bidders play mixed strategy in equilibrium, and type-(Vh, L)’s
support is lower than type-(Vh, s0)’s support which is also lower than type-(Vh,H)’s. This is
because type-(Vh, L) bidder perceives her opponent more likely to be type-Vl bidder, type-(Vh,H)
bidder regards her opponent more likely as type-Vh bidder, and type-(Vh, s0) bidder still takes
her ex ante belief. Then their best responses would result in such a support ranking. When the
informative cost is large, namely, c = plp2h(Vh−Vl)(2q− 1), no bidder acquires information and
it degenerates to the standard FPA equilibrium with primitive e ∈ E .
The proof of the proposition is a little bit involved, but the basic idea is simple. It is always
true that if the bidder plays mixed strategy in submitting her bid, she should get exactly the same
expected surplus from any bid drawn from the corresponding support. This fact (indifference
condition implied by mixed strategy) can help pin down the c.d.f of the bid as well as the upper
or lower bound of the support. The same idea applies that the bidder should be indifferent
between acquiring information and not acquiring information if she plays mixed strategy in IA.
3.3 Demand for Information
We call piE the demand for ex ante information, since for any informative cost c, the equilibrium
is symmetric and unique.
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Substituting δ1, δ2 and δ3 into (11) and rearranging terms yields the formula of the reverse
demand for information:
c = plph(Vh − Vl) · plphq(2q − 1)
plq + ph(1− q)2piE ·
(1− piE)
(1− phqpiE) . (14)
Immediately, we have the following intuitive result as a corollary of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 (Demand for Ex Ante Information) The probability of ex ante IA, piE, has the
following properties:
(i). For all given values q ∈ (0.5, 1], piE is continuous in c for c = 0, and strictly decreasing
in c for c ∈ [0, plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1)].
(ii). For all values c = 0, piE is (weakly) increasing in accuracy q.
When the cost of the signal is small, i.e., c 5 plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1), the probability of
acquiring information, piE , satisfies the usual law of demand. This is intuitive because a more
costly signal provides less incentive for the bidder when the accuracy keeps fixed.
On the other hand, a more informative signal will help the bidder evaluate her opponent
more effectively, and hence is more attractive to the bidder, provided the cost does not change.
Quantitatively, Figure 1 presents the simulated results for the impacts of cost c and accuracy
q on IA probability piE , respectively. It verifies the comparative results for piE . The primitive
values are Vh = 2, Vl = 1 and pl = ph = 0.5, which are chosen for computing convenience.
When considering the impact of the informative cost c, we choose two fixed values of accuracy,
q = 0.8 which is a representative of generic accuracy and q = 1 which represents the perfect
accuracy. When considering the impact of the accuracy q, we fix the cost to be c = 0 (special
costless case) and c = 0.02 (a representative of generic cost). These numeric values will be used
continually in the following sections for consistency. The kink points in the figure correspond
to the critical values of c and q that satisfy the condition c = plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1). In the left
sub-figure, the kink points are at critical value c = 0.075 for q = 0.8 and c = 0.125 for q = 1. In
the right sub-figure, the kink point is at the critical value q = 0.58 for c = 0.02.
In equilibrium, we see the type-Vl bidder ignores the signal received. Thus, one can expect
that if we relax the endogenous information acquisition assumption, i.e., permitting collecting
information at interim stage, the type-Vh’s demand for information can even be intensified. This
is investigated in the next section. We will discuss the welfare analysis and comparative statics
of ex ante IA equilibrium in section 5.
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Figure 1: Cost and Accuracy’s Impacts on IA Probability piE
Primitive: Vh = 2, Vl = 1, pl = ph = 0.5.
4 Interim Information Acquisition
In the previous section we consider the auction economy in which the bidder can freely choose
to collect information about her opponent’s valuation ex ante, but it is still very restrictive in
the sense that the type-Vl bidder in the interim stage would definitely ignore the signal received.
In other words, if the realized valuation is Vl, the bidder cannot benefit from the signal she
receives because she cannot do better than bid her valuation Vl. In this section we consider
the sealed-bid auction economy in which information acquisition choice is made after bidders’
valuations are realized, which will give the bidders more freedom to formalize their strategy in
the auction game.
4.1 The Model
The procedures of this auction game are as follows:
• Stage 1. Nature draws a valuation for each bidder and tells the bidder only what her own
valuation is.
• Stage 2. Every bidder decides whether to incur a cost c to receive a signal si based on
her valuation, and this decision as well as the signal received cannot be observed by her
opponent.
• Stage 3. Bidders submit their bids simultaneously based on their own valuations, and
possibly the updated belief from the signal received according to (2).
• Stage 4. The bidder whose bid is the highest receives the object and pays what she bids.
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In this interim IA auction game, bidder i’s strategy is a bidimensional mapping (ci,bi),
such that C 3 ci : {Vl, Vh} −→ Fa({0, 1}) represents the IA choice rule and B 3 bi : T −→
Fb([0, Vh]) represents the bidding rule, where AIi = C × B is bidder i’s strategy space. Denote
((c1,b1), (c2,b2)) = (AI1, AI2) ∈ AI1 ×AI2 ≡ AI as one strategy profile.8
Similar as the ex ante IA setting, given a strategy profile (AI1, A
I
2) ∈ AI , there would be an ex
ante joint distribution of the random vector (a1, v1, b1; a2, v2, b2), Γ(a1, v1, b1; a2, v2, b2|AI1, AI2)
induced by (AI1, A
I
2), here (ai, vi, bi) refers to the realization profile of bidder i’s information
acquisition choice, valuation and bid sumbitted. The ex post payoff gI ≡ (gI1 , gI2) : {1, 0}2×V2×
[0, Vh]2 −→ R2 takes the same form as gE in (3), i.e.,
gIi (a1, v1, b1; a2, v2, b2) = (vi − bi) ·
[
1{bi > bj}+ 121{bi = bj}
]
− aic, i 6= j, i = 1, 2. (15)
Hence, the ex ante expected payoff GI ≡ (GI1, GI2) : AI −→ R2 is given by
GIi (A
I
1, A
I
2) = EΓ(·|AI1,AI2)
[
gIi (a1, v1, b1; a2, v2, b2)
]
, i = 1, 2, (16)
A tuple < AI , GI > with primitive e ∈ E is then called an interim IA auction game.
4.2 Equilibrium
The argument of Lemma 1 in the appendix does not require the detailed structure of informa-
tion acquisition, and therefore, the result that type-Vl bidder bids Vl in pure strategy in any
equilibrium remains valid in our interim IA setting. Then only the type-Vh bidder has incentives
to receive costly informative signal. Similarly, the equilibrium of the interim IA auction game
< AI , GI > is unique, symmetric and can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 The interim IA auction game < AI , GI > with primitive e ∈ E has a unique
equilibrium. More specifically:
(i). When the informative cost is small, i.e. 0 5 c < plph(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1), then the unique
equilibrium of the FPA is symmetric and can be described as follows. For i = 1, 2
1. piliI = 0. The type-Vl bidder does not incur any cost to receive any signal.
2. pihiI = piI . The type-Vh bidder, with probability piI , chooses to incur a cost c to collect
information on her opponent’s private valuation; with probability 1− piI she does not
incur any cost.
8ci is effectively referred to two distributions on binary support {1, 0}. Hence, ci can be represented as
((piliI , 1 − piliI), (pihiI , 1 − pihiI)) where piliI = Pr{ai = 1|vi = Vl} denotes the IA probability of the type-Vl bidder i
and pihiI = Pr{ai = 1|vi = Vh} denotes that of the type-Vh bidder i.
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3. bi(Vl, s0) = Vl.
4. When q = 1, type-(Vh, L) bidder submits bi(Vh, L) = Vl for sure; when q < 1, type-
(Vh, L) bidder mixes over (Vl, β1] according to the c.d.f. Ql(·) specified by
Ql(b) =
plq
piIph(1− q)2 ·
b− Vl
Vh − b , b ∈ (Vl, β1]. (17)
5. Type-(Vh, s0) bidder mixes over [β1, β2] according to the c.d.f. Qs0(·) specified by
Qs0(b) =
pl + piI(1− q)ph
ph(1− piI) ·
b− β1
Vh − b , b ∈ [β1, β2]. (18)
6. Type-(Vh,H) bidder mixes over [β2, β3] according to the c.d.f. Qh(·) specified by
Qh(b) =
pl(1− q) + phq(1− piIq)
piIphq2
· b− β2
Vh − b , b ∈ [β2, β3]. (19)
Here
β1 =
plqVl + piIph(1− q)2Vh
plq + piIph(1− q)2 , (20)
β2 =
ph(1− piI)Vh + [pl + piI(1− q)ph]β1
pl + ph(1− piIq) , (21)
β3 =
piIphq
2Vh + [pl(1− q) + phq(1− piIq)]β2
pl(1− q) + phq , (22)
and piI is determined by the following condition
plq(Vh − Vl) + [pl(1− q) + phq(1− piIq)](Vh − β2)− c
=[pl + piI(1− q)ph](Vh − β1).
(23)
(ii). When c = plph(Vh−Vl)(2q−1), the unique equilibrium of the FPA is symmetric and can
be described as follows. For i = 1, 2
1. piliI = pi
h
iI = 0. No bidder acquires information.
2. bi(Vl, s0) = Vl.
3. Type-(Vh, s0) bidder mixes over (Vl, γ] according to the c.d.f. J¯(·), where J¯(·) and γ
are given by (12) and (13), respectively.
Remark 4 As in the unique equilibrium of ex ante information acquisition, when the informa-
tive cost is negligible, i.e., c = 0, the information acquisition probability piI reduces to 1.
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Remark 5 For equilibrium strategies in part (i), if piE = 0, type-(Vh, L) and type-(Vh,H) bid-
ders disappear, and the formula Qs0(·) remains valid; if piE = 1, type-(Vh, s0) bidder disappears,
and the formulas Ql(·) and Qh(·) remain valid.
In the unique equilibrium of interim information acquisition specified by Proposition 2, type-
Vl bidder has no incentive to acquire information and bids her valuation Vl, type-Vh bidder plays
a mixed strategy in information acquisition choice. The type-(Vh, L), type-(Vh, s0) and type-
(Vh,H) bidders randomly draw their bids in equilibrium, and type-(Vh, L)’s support is lower
than type-(Vh, s0)’s, while the latter is also lower than type-(Vh,H)’s. This is similar to the
bidding rule of ex ante information acquisition, so is the reason behind.
4.3 Demand for Interim Information
We call piI the demand for interim information, since for any informative cost c, the equilibrium
is symmetric and unique.
The strategies in interim IA equilibrium share the same formulas as those in ex ante IA
equilibrium, except for the indifference condition that determines the probability piI . Obviously
in interim IA setting, the type Vl bidder always gets zero surplus and has no incentive to acquire
information, and the equation to pin down piI only concerns the type-Vh bidder. Therefore,
the multiplier ph on both sides of (11) is eliminated, which yields (23). Again rearranging this
equation yields the reverse demand for information in interim equilibrium, namely,
c = plph(Vh − Vl) · plq(2q − 1)
plq + ph(1− q)2piI ·
(1− piI)
(1− phqpiI) . (24)
Parallel to the expression for piE , we have the property that piI decreases as the cost goes up,
the same as that in ex ante setting. And moreover, the interim demand for information, piI , is
higher than the ex ante demand piE when facing the same cost in a proper range. These results
are summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 (Demand for Interim Information) The probability of interim IA, piI , has the
following properties:
(i). For all given values q ∈ (0.5, 1], piI is continuous in informative cost c for c = 0, and
strictly decreasing for c ∈ [0, plph(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1)].
(ii). For all values c = 0, piI is (weakly) increasing in accuracy q.
(iii). piI > piE for c ∈ (0, plph(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1)), q ∈ (0.5, 1].
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We have known qualitatively how bidders submit their bids in equilibrium. Now we give a
numeric example to illustrate their bidding rules and expected payoffs in equilibrium.
Example 1 Let Vh = 2, Vl = 1, q = 0.8, pl = ph = 0.5, c = 0.02. Then Table 1 gives
the probabilities of acquiring information at ex ante and interim stage, the endpoints of bidding
supports and the corresponding expected payoffs (the formula of the expected payoff will be given
in the next section). Figure 2 shows the mixing bid supports for this numeric example. Note
that in standard first price auction without IA, the payoff of the bidder is 0.25, which is equal
to plph(Vh − Vl).
Ex Ante Interim
piE 0.7170 piI 0.8572
δ1 1.0346 β1 1.0411
δ2 1.2261 β2 1.1453
δ3 1.5812 β3 1.6142
SE 0.2760 SI 0.2804
No IA
γ 1.5
S0 0.25
Table 1: Example of IA and Bidding
γ
Interim IA
Ex Ante IA
Vl Vh
β1 β2 β3Vl Vh
δ1 δ2 δ3
Figure 2: Bid Support
5 Discussion: Welfare Analysis and Comparative Statics
5.1 Ex Ante Information Acquisition
One central question that motivates our project is whether bidders benefit from acquiring in-
formation concerning opponent’s valuations. The answer is affirmative. Information acquisition
indeed improves the bidder’s surplus, albeit it cannot improve the allocative efficiency (the ef-
ficient allocations have been obtained in standard FPA with the same primitive e). However,
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since the information is costly and the expected social value of the object is fixed, the seller nec-
essarily raises less revenue. We will discuss how cost c and accuracy q impact bidder’s surplus
and seller’s revenue as well as total social surplus in the following subsections.
5.1.1 Bidder’s Surplus
Bidder’s expected payoff in ex ante IA equilibrium has been given in the indifference condition
(11), either left or right hand side specifies the net surplus. By substituting δ1 into the right
hand side of (11), we have a simple formula for bidder’s expected payoff
SE =
plq + phpiEq(1− q)
plq + phpiE(1− q)2 · plph(Vh − Vl), (25)
which is strictly increasing in the probability of acquiring information, piE when the signal is
noisy but informative, i.e., q ∈ (0.5, 1). The standard FPA with the same primitive e will give
the bidder surplus S0 = plph(Vh − Vl), which can be obtained by setting piE = 0 in (25). Note
that the demand for information piE is decreasing in informative cost c by Corollary 1, then we
have the results summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Bidder’s net payoff in the ex ante IA auction game < AE , GE > with primitive
e, SE, has the following properties:
(i). SE exceeds the payoff in the standard FPA with primitive e, i.e., SE=S0 and the inequality
is strict for q ∈ (0.5, 1) and c < plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1).
(ii). In the presence of noisy but informative signal, namely, q ∈ (0.5, 1), SE is strictly decreas-
ing in informative cost c for c5plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1).
The proposition says the competition between bidders is not so fierce as that of the standard
FPA auctions. This is because by knowing more about the opponents’ valuations, type-(Vh, L)
and type-(Vh, s0) bidders bid more conservatively, see the numerical Example 1. For instance,
the type-(Vh, L) bidder submits her bid very closely to Vl. The type-(Vh,H) bidder seems to
bid more aggressively, i.e. in Example 1, the upper bound of her bid support δ3 = 1.5812 is
higher than γ = 1.5, the upper bound of type-Vh bidder’s support in standard FPA. However,
on average, bidders with valuation Vh bid less than they do in the standard FPA.
The informative cost c plays an important role in determining the bidder’s expected surplus.
To consider the interested comparative statics, suppose q ∈ (0.5, 1). As the cost increases,
bidder’s incentive to acquire information reduces and piE decreases. Therefore, on average the
type-Vh bidder submits bid in a less pointed manner, which leads to less expected payoff.
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The accuracy q has a disparate impact on bidder’s payoff. An increment in accuracy has
two effects. On one hand, a more accurate signal improves the bidder’s updated belief and the
bidder will bid more effectively if receiving the signal, which can increase the expected payoff.
On the other hand, a more informative signal reduces the bidder’s private information, and thus,
increases the competitiveness and leads bidder’s potential surplus to decrease. Theoretically, it
is not clear which effect dominates the other at all possible values of q. However, for extreme
cases, we can see how q affects bidder’s surplus.
A very noisy signal provides bidders with no incentive to acquire information. It is easy to see
that the upper bound of the cost, beyond which no bidder will choose to acquire information,
plp
2
h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1) will be smaller than any given positive c if q stays sufficiently close to
1
2 . Therefore, piE = 0 for q in some small neighborhood of
1
2 . As the informativeness of the
signal improves, piE will be positive, hence the expected surplus of bidder goes above S0 in this
corresponding range of q. On the other hand when the signal is completely accurate, i.e., q = 1,
bidder’s expected surplus falls back to S0 by (25), which seems to be a little bit counterintuitive.
Note that when q = 1, a type-(Vh, s) bidder cannot confront with a type-(Vh, L) opponent due
to complete informativeness of the signal for all s ∈ {H,L, s0}. This reduces the probability
of winning against a relatively “weak” opponent, and therefore, leads to less expected surplus.
When q is somewhat informative but noisy, we do not know theoretically how bidder’s surplus
changes as q increases. However, it seems that quantitatively the payoff is likely to increase first
and then decrease as q goes up.
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Figure 3: Cost and Accuracy’s Impacts on Bidder’s Payoff
Primitive: Vh = 2, Vl = 1, pl = ph = 12 .
Numerically, the comparative results can be seen in Figure 3, which confirms the comparative
results for SE . Note that SE = S0 for q = 1 regardless of the value of piE , and piE = 1 for c = 0
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regardless of the value of q.
5.1.2 Total Surplus
In the unique equilibrium of ex ante information acquisition, the object is always optimally
allocated, so the total ex ante expected social welfare is equal to the expected value of max{v1, v2}
minus total expected informative cost. Since E[max{v1, v2}] = p2l Vl+(1−p2l )Vh and each bidder
incurs expected informative cost piEc, the total expected surplus then would be
TSE = p2l Vl + (1− p2l )Vh − 2piEc. (26)
Note that if there is no information acquisition, the expected total social surplus would be
TS0 = p2l Vl + (1 − p2l )Vh by setting piE = 0 in (26). We can see the expected information
cost 2piEc, which can be regarded as an information rent, becomes the deadweight loss. Hence,
the ex ante IA equilibrium outcome is inefficient9 if bidders incur cost to acquire information,
which differs from the result in Fang and Morris’ binary value model that the exogenous IA
equilibrium outcome is always efficient due to zero-cost setting, which can be regarded as “first
best” outcome. Then the equilibrium outcome in our ex ante IA model may be regarded as
“second best” outcome, compared to the ideal case in Fang and Morris’ model.
The impacts of cost and accuracy on total surplus is then summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 4 The expected total social surplus in the ex ante IA auction game < AE , GE >
with primitive e, TSE, has the following properties:
(i). TSE is less than the social surplus in the standard FPA with the primitive e, i.e., TSE5TS0
and the inequality is strict for q ∈ (0.5, 1) and 0 < c < plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1).
(ii). Suppose the accuracy q ∈ (0.5, 1] is given, then TSE is decreasing in cost c for c ∈
[0, cETS(q)) and increasing in cost c for c ∈ [cETS(q), plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1)], where cETS(q) ∈
(0, plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1)) is a constant dependent on q.
(iii). Suppose the cost c ∈ (0, plp2h(Vh−Vl)) is given, then TSE is weakly decreasing in accuracy
q ∈ (0.5, 1].
We know that piE is decreasing when cost c goes up. It turns out that their product, the
expected cost piEc first increases when cost is moderate and then decreases as cost becomes
9The efficiency here refers to whether the social surplus is at its maximum level, i.e., E[max{v1, v2}], not to
allocative efficiency.
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large. Therefore, the total social surplus has a “U” shape response to cost. Provided the cost of
information acquisition is fixed, a more informative signal will increase the IA probability piE ,
hence the resulted social surplus decreases due to more expected cost. In other words, more
accurate signal actually hurts social benefit since the incurred information cost is deadweight
loss.
Figure 4 shows how social surplus reacts to the variation in cost c and to the variation in
accuracy q, respectively, using the same primitive values as in previous numeric simulations.
We can see no IA is the best outcome for the whole auction economy, and more accurate signal
makes the total welfare worse-off.
The above analysis implies that in realistic auction environment with information acquisition,
the efficient outcome is not generally achievable due to dissipative information cost. One policy
implication would be that information acquisition should be prevented to maximize the social
surplus. This can be done by means of raising the information cost or reducing the accuracy of
the signal or both. Or if possible, the central planner can directly control the IA choices to ease
social welfare loss.
However, when the cost is not a loss and is actually transferred to some party who provides
information, then information acquisition has no impact on social surplus. We will discuss it in
more detail in section 6.1.
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Figure 4: Cost and Accuracy’s Impacts on Total Surplus
Primitive: Vh = 2, Vl = 1, pl = ph = 12 .
5.1.3 Seller’s Revenue
The total social surplus contains two parts, the revenue of the seller and the surplus of the
bidder. Therefore, seller’s expected revenue χE equates to the expected total surplus minus two
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bidders’ expected payoffs, namely,
χE = [p2l Vl + (1− p2l )Vh]− 2piEc− 2SE . (27)
Immediately by setting piE = 0 in (27), we know the revenue would be χ0 = [p2l Vl + (1 −
p2l )Vh]−2S0 = (1−p2h)Vl+p2hVh in standard FPA. The equation (27) also tells us that the seller
effectively bears the informative cost that is incurred by bidders. Note that SE(q, piE) = S0,
therefore, seller always gets revenue less than χ0 in ex ante IA auction. Approximately, bidder’s
surplus and seller’s revenue change in opposite directions. To summarize, we have the following
comparative statics for seller’s revenue.
Proposition 5 Seller’s revenue in the ex ante IA auction game < AE , GE > with primitive e,
χE, has the following properties:
(i). χE is less than χ0, seller’s revenue in standard FPA with primitive e, and the inequality
is strict for c < plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1) and q ∈ (0.5, 1).
(ii). Suppose the signal is noisy but informative, namely, q ∈ (0.5, 1). Then there exists some
constant cE(q) ∈ (0, plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1)) dependent on q, such that χE is decreasing
in informative cost c for c ∈ [0, cE(q)) and increasing in cost c for c ∈ [cE(q), plp2h(Vh −
Vl)(2q − 1)].
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Figure 5: Cost and Accuracy’s Impacts on Seller’s Revenue
Primitive: Vh = 2, Vl = 1, pl = ph = 12 .
Figure 5 shows the behaviors of revenue in response to the cost c and the accuracy q, both
of which demonstrate a “U” shape response, which verifies the properties of χE stated in the
Proposition 5.
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Obviously, seller’s revenue achieves its maximum χ0 only when bidders do not acquire infor-
mation (piE = 0, or c=plp2h(Vh−Vl)(2q− 1)) or the signal is costless and completely informative
(q = 1 and c = 0), according to the formula (27). Due to efficient allocation, bidders’ benefits
would necessarily conflict with seller’s interest, which implies the seller would definitely prefer
no information acquisition. Then one policy implication would be that to raise more revenue,
the seller should prevent bidders from acquiring information, or induce either very noisy signal
or completely accurate signal whenever possible.
5.2 Surplus and Revenue in Interim IA Equilibrium
5.2.1 Bidder’s Surplus
Similar to ex ante IA equilibrium, bidder’s expected payoff in interim IA equilibrium has been
given in either side of the indifference condition (23). By substituting β1 into the right hand
side of (23), we have a simple formula for bidder’s expected payoff
SI =
plq + phpiIq(1− q)
plq + phpiI(1− q)2 · plph(Vh − Vl). (28)
Hence we have the comparative results summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 In the presence of noisy signal, i.e. q ∈ (0.5, 1), and for c 5 plph(Vh−Vl)(2q−1),
we have
(i). Bidder’s net payoff SI is decreasing in informative cost c, and hence exceeds its counterpart
payoff, S0 from standard FPA without IA;
(ii). SI = SE, and the inequality is strict for c ∈ (0, plph(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1)) and q ∈ (0.5, 1),
provided the auctions < AE , GE > and < AI , GI > have the same primitive e ∈ E .
This proposition is parallel to Proposition 3, and it says the impact of cost on bidder’s payoff
is similar to that of the ex ante IA case. When the signal is more costly, the type-Vh bidder
would be less likely to acquire information, and bidder’s expected payoff goes down. Also the
accuracy of the signal has similar influence on bidder’s payoff as in ex ante case.
The information acquisition choice in interim stage becomes valuation-type-specific and turns
to be more efficient in terms of the utilization of the information. Hence bidders get higher ex
ante expected payoffs in auction game < AI , GI > than in < AE , GE >.
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5.2.2 Total Surplus
In equilibrium of interim information acquisition, the object is optimally allocated, hence the
total expected social welfare equates to the total expected surplus minus total expected infor-
mative cost
TSI = p2l Vl + (1− p2l )Vh − 2phpiIc. (29)
Again similar to the ex ante IA case, the information cost 2phpiIc turns to the deadweight
loss, and the interim IA equilibrium outcome is not efficient, either.
Immediately, we have the following comparative results:
Proposition 7 The expected total social surplus in the interim IA auction game < AI , GI >
with primitive e, TSI , has the following properties:
(i). TSI is less than the social surplus in the standard FPA with the primitive e, i.e., TSI5TS0
and the inequality is strict for q ∈ (0.5, 1) and 0 < c < plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1).
(ii). Suppose the accuracy q ∈ (0.5, 1] is given, then TSI is decreasing in cost c for c ∈ [0, cITS(q))
and increasing in cost c for c ∈ [cITS(q), plp2h(Vh−Vl)(2q−1)], where cITS(q) ∈ (0, plp2h(Vh−
Vl)(2q − 1)) is a constant dependent on q.
(iii). Suppose the cost c ∈ (0, plp2h(Vh − Vl)) is given, then TSI is weakly decreasing in accuracy
q ∈ (0.5, 1].
This proposition is parallel to Proposition 4, and the comparative results are similar in two
different IA settings. Unlike the bidder’s surplus, we cannot unambiguously rank the total
surpluses TSE and TSI . This is because the expected cost 2piEc in ex ante IA setting can be
larger or smaller than the expected cost 2phpiIc in interim IA setting.
5.2.3 Seller’s Revenue
Since total surplus includes seller’s revenue and bidders’ surpluses, then the revenue has the
following expression,
χI = p2l Vl + (1− p2l )Vh − 2phpiIc− 2SI . (30)
Then we have the following results.
Proposition 8 Seller’s revenue in interim IA auction game < AI , GI > with primitive e, χI ,
has the following properties:
(i). χI is less than χ0, seller’s revenue in standard FPA with primitive e, and the inequality is
strict for c < plph(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1) and q ∈ (0.5, 1).
23
(ii). Suppose the signal is noisy but informative, namely, q ∈ (0.5, 1). Then there exists some
constant cI(q) ∈ (0, plph(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1)) dependent on q, such that χI is decreasing in
informative cost c for c ∈ [0, cI(q)) and increasing in cost c for c ∈ [cI(q), plph(Vh−Vl)(2q−
1)].
Quantitatively, bidder’s expected surplus and seller’s revenue have similar responses to the
cost and the accuracy of the signal as those in ex ante equilibrium, and the only difference
between ex ante and interim environments is the magnitude. We cannot generally tell whether
seller gets more revenue in the ex ante IA auction < AE , GE > or in the interim IA auction
< AI , GI > despite the unambiguous ranking for bidders’ surpluses in two different IA settings
because it is not clear in which setting the expected cost is higher.
5.3 Comparison Across Auction Formats
It is obvious that the object is always efficiently allocated in our first price IA auction model since
bidders have binary values. As we have discussed at the very beginning, information acquisition
plays no role in formulating bidders’ strategies in second price auction (SPA) since each bidder
has weakly dominant strategy to bid truthfully, but it remains worth making comparisons across
FPA and SPA formats because the revenue equivalence still holds between these auctions without
any type of information acquisition.10
Consider SPA in our basic setting with primitive e ∈ E . The seller gets Vh if and only if
both bidders have values Vh, which occurs with probability p2h, otherwise the seller receives Vl.
Therefore in SPA, seller’s expected surplus, denoted by χSPA, would be
χSPA = (1− p2h)Vl + p2hVh. (31)
On the other hand, each bidder obtains positive surplus, i.e. (Vh − Vl) if and only if her own
value is Vh and her opponent has value Vl, which occurs with probability plph. Then bidders’
expected surplus from SPA, denoted by SSPA, is
SSPA = plph(Vh − Vl). (32)
This yields the following results:
Proposition 9 Suppose 0 < c < plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1), q ∈ (0.5, 1). Provided (FPA) IA games
< AE , GE >, < AI , GI >, and SPA are permitted in the basic setting e ∈ E , then we have
10This can be seen in the Appendix of Fang and Morris (2006).
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1. Bidder’s expected surplus from FPA is strictly higher than that from SPA, regardless of
the stage at which the IA choice is made, i.e., SE > SSPA and SI > SSPA.
2. Seller gets strictly less expected revenue from FPA than that from SPA, no matter at which
stage bidder can acquire information, i.e., χE < χSPA and χI < χSPA.
The first item could follow from Proposition 3 and Proposition 6, since the revenue equiva-
lence still holds with discrete values across standard FPA and SPA without information acqui-
sition, i.e., SSPA = S0, and IA plays no role in formulating strategies in SPA.
The revenue ranking is unambiguously clear across FPA and SPA for our binary value
model.11 However, this ranking does not hold generally for endogenous IA. For example, when
valuation has continuous support, then it is possible that seller gets more revenue in FPA than
in SPA.
It is obvious that bidders have strong incentives to acquire information about their opponents’
valuations intentionally in FPA if it is permitted, but not in SPA. The other fact is that the
auctioneer is worse-off in FPA, if such an information acquisition occurs, which differs from the
result that revenue increases associated with traditional information acquisition. The natural
policy implication would be that the seller may need to deter bidders’ potential information
acquisition to maximize her revenue if bidders’ private values are independent.
6 Some Variants
6.1 Third Party Charges the Informative Cost
In our basic setting, we do not model where the informative signal comes from, i.e., who provides
the information. Therefore, in our welfare analysis, the informative cost becomes the deadweight
loss of total social surplus. Also, we leave it open for pricing the signal. It seems that the two
issues can be resolved by introducing the third party who actually collects information and sells
it to bidders.
Suppose there exists such a third party at ex ante stage(the case is similar at interim stage).
The party has the access to collect noisy information concerning bidders’ valuations without in-
curring any cost, and aims to maximize its total revenue from providing information. Therefore,
11Note that here the revenue equivalence fails. It’s true that allocations do not pin down the revenue in discrete
type settings, which might contribute to the failure of revenue equivalence in standard auctions. However, Fang
and Morris (2006) already show that in standard auctions without information acquisition, the revenue equivalence
holds in discrete setting. It follows that the realized asymmetric information structure from IA contributes to the
failure of the RET; besides, the informative cost c also plays a role here.
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the third party has objective function
τE(c) = 2piEc. (33)
By Proposition 1, the possible informative cost charged by this party is the interval [0, plp2h(Vh−
Vl)(2q− 1)]. If the accuracy of the transmitted signal q cannot be controlled by this party, then
the optimal cost for this party would be cETS(q), which is the constant given in Proposition 4
item (ii). The interesting thing is that if the accuracy can be chosen by this party, then definitely
the party will choose optimal accuracy q∗ = 1 to maximize the expected cost 2piEc because piE
is increasing in q by Corollary 1. However, bidders cannot benefit from this completely accurate
signal since they can just get expected surplus SE = S0. This optimal choice may favor the
seller to some extent, for bidders’ having less surplus means that seller may get more revenue
(increment in expected cost will reduce revenue at the same time).
One key point is that the expected total surplus now is always a constant TS = TS0 since the
expected cost – the deadweight loss – now turns to be the benefit of the third party. Therefore,
the IA auction game < AE , GE > becomes one mechanism that redistributes the total surplus
amongst bidders, seller and the information provider. Moreover, part of seller’s revenue is
redistributed to bidders and the information provider compared to the standard FPA with the
same primitive, which can be easily seen from the formula (27).
6.2 Observable Information Acquisition
This paper considers covert information acquisition on opponent’s valuation, and it is crucial
to maintain the assumption that the choice of acquiring information is unobservable to the
opponent. It will result in two problems without this assumption. We consider the interim IA
setting. First, the signal structure is not inherently consistent. This is a model with binary
valuations, hence only the type-Vh bidder has incentive to acquire information. If this action
is public information, then it is a perfect signal that tells bidder j vi = Vh when i acquires
information. Also bidder j could be a type-Vh bidder who already acquires information and
receives a signal sj , then sj is meaningless for the bidder, thus why should the bidder incur a
cost to acquire information? Second, there could be no equilibrium in some subcases. Suppose
bidder i has valuation Vh and acquires information and bidder j does not, and this is common
knowledge. In this case, no equilibrium bidding strategy exists with fair tie breaking rule.12
Hence observable information acquisition is undesirable for our modeling.
12This case is the same as the Example 4.4 on pp.53 of Krishna’s book, which is another version of the example
in Maskin and Riley (2000). The equilibrium could be restored but we need Vickrey tie breaking rule.
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6.3 More Realizations
Besides the binary values, more points of valuation support could be added in. As Fang and
Morris (2006) have observed: it does not admit any equilibrium for exogenous information
acquisition with generic parameters even in binary valuation support model. Thus for more
points, the equilibrium analysis would also be problematic. As for continuous valuation support,
the formation of bidding rule with multiple arguments turns to be a rather involved problem,
which is the essential question with multidimension. This is an open question for future research.
6.4 Beyond Private Values
Admittedly, we specify an independent private value setting, which seems to be restrictive in
some sense. This endogenous IA specification can be extended to other non-private value envi-
ronment. For example, it turns out that in endogenous IA first-price auction with interdependent
discrete valuations, bidder can also get higher payoff than that of standard FPA without IA,
which is the environment we haven’t considered here but are working on.
7 Conclusion
This paper mainly investigates bidders’ covert information acquisition on opponents’ valuations
in first price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values, which leads to bidimensional
strategy space and bidimensional type space. We present two different specifications: ex ante
information acquisition and interim information acquisition. We find that: (i) bidder’s expected
payoff exceeds that of the counterpart standard FPA when informative cost is small and the
signal is informative and noisy; (ii) the auctioned object is always efficiently allocated due
to the settings of binary values; (iii) in all cases in which bidder acquires information with
positive probability, the auctioneer’s expected revenue is lower than that of the standard auction,
which contradicts the results in the current information acquisition literature; (iv) the incurred
informative cost becomes the deadweight loss in total social surplus and the equilibrium outcome
is inefficient. The natural implication of our analysis would be that seller needs to prevent bidders
from acquiring information to raise more revenue. Also from the social planner’s point of view,
information acquisition should be prevented to maximize social welfare. We also analyze how
the accuracy and the informative cost impact on bidders’ expected surplus, seller’s revenue and
total surplus. Some possible variations of the model are discussed at last.
Our paper takes the first step to explore the properties of endogenous information acquisition
on opponents’ valuations in the context of independent private value auctions. We do find bidders
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have incentives to take this IA action. To see the robustness of the results, continuous support
necessitates exploration. It seems that the difficulty rests with the multidimensional bidding
rules. Moreover, the probability of acquiring information is probably a function of bidder’s
valuation. These are open questions for future exploration.
8 Appdendix
Proof of Lemma 1: For ti ∈ {Vl}× {L,H, s0}, let type-ti bidder i’s bidding support be either
[bti1 , b
ti
2 ] with b
ti
1 5 b
ti
2 5 Vl or (b
ti
1 , b
ti
2 ] with b
ti
1 < b
ti
2 5 Vl(the upper bound of the support interval
may be open, but this is not important for the argument). Let t ∈ argmint1∈{Vl}×{L,H,s0} bt11
and t′ ∈ argmint2∈{Vl}×{L,H,s0} bt21 .
We first show that type-t bidder 1 and type-t′ bidder 2 should bid in pure strategies. It is
obvious that bt1 = b
t′
1 = b1 since b
t
1 and b
t′
1 are the possible smallest bids for bidders 1 and 2,
respectively. There are four possible cases that can be ruled out in equilibrium.
Case 1: type-t bidder 1 has support (b1, bt2] and type-t
′ bidder 2 has support (b1, bt
′
2 ] where
b1 < b
t
2 and b1 < b
t′
2 . We can see that the bid b =
b1+min{bt2, bt
′
2 }
2 will yield both type-t bidder 1
and type-t′ bidder 2 positive surplus. However, bids close to b1 will win with probability almost
zero, hence both bidder 1 and type-t′ bidder 2’s surpluses will approach zero by submitting a
bid close to b1. This is a contradiction with the indifference condition given by mixed strategy,
so this pattern of the supports cannot be the case.
Case 2: type-t bidder 1 has support (b1, bt2] and type-t
′ bidder 2 has support [b1, bt
′
2 ] where
b1 < b
t
2 and b1 < b
t′
2 , or type-t bidder 1 has support [b1, b
t
2] and type-t
′ bidder 2 has support
(b1, bt
′
2 ] where b1 < b
t
2 and b1 < b
t′
2 . Since the two subcases are symmetric, consider the former
one. It is easy to see a bid b1 yields bidder 2 exactly zero surplus due to zero winning prob-
ability. However, a bid b = b1+min{b
t
2, b
t′
2 }
2 yields bidder 2 strictly positive expected surplus, a
contradiction with the indifference condition. This pattern cannot be true either.
Case 3: type-t bidder 1 has support [b1, bt2] and type-t
′ bidder 2 has support [b1, bt
′
2 ] where
either b1 < bt2 and b1 < b
t′
2 , or b1 = b
t
2 and b1 < b
t′
2 , or b1 = b
t′
2 and b1 < b
t
2. Consider the subcase
where b1 < bt2. A bid
b1+bt2
2 will yield type-t bidder 1 positive surplus. Hence by indifference
condition, a bid b1 will give type-t bidder 1 positive surplus, which requires her opponent—
bidder 2 to submit a bid b1 with positive probability so that type-t bidder 1 can win against
bidder 2 with positive probability by submitting b1. However, then, if type-t bidder 1 submits
a bid slightly higher than b1, this bid will yield a jump in winning probability against bidder 2,
hence a jump in expected surplus of type-t bidder 1. Again a contradiction with the requirement
of mixed strategy. The subcase where b1 < bt
′
2 follows the same argument.
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Case 4: type-t bidder 1 has support (b1, bt2] with b1 < b
t
2, type-t
′ bidder 2 bids b1 with
probability 1; or type-t′ bidder 2 has support (b1, bt
′
2 ] with b1 < b
t′
2 , type-t bidder 1 bids b1 with
probability 1. By symmetry, it suffices to consider the former subcase. It is obvious that type-t′
bidder 2’s strategy is not optimal. The bid b1 wins against none of bidder 1’s bids, hence yields
bidder 2 zero surplus. By submitting a bid b1+b
t
2
2 , type-t
′ bidder 2 gets strictly positive expected
surplus, which is a profitable deviation.
Since all those cases are excluded from equilibrium, we conclude that it must be true in
equilibrium that b1 = bt2 = b
t′
2 . In other words, type-t bidder 1 and type-t
′ bidder 2 bid in pure
strategies.
We then show that b1 = Vl. Suppose b1 < Vl, then either type-t bidder 1 or type-t′ bidder
2 can deviate by submitting a slightly higher bid b1 + ² with probability 1, which will be a
profitable deviation by choosing ² arbitrarily close to zero. A contradiction.
Note that b1 is the possible lowest bid for all types ti ∈ {Vl} × {L,H, s0}, i = 1, 2 and those
bidders will never bid more than their valuation Vl. The proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 1: We take several steps to complete this argument. First we verify that
the provided strategies in the proposition actually constitute an equilibrium. Then we show that
there is no other symmetric equilibrium. Last we argue that there is no asymmetric equilibrium
either.
One point we would like to clarify before the formal proof is that in part (i) for q ∈ (0, 1),
when q approaches 1 from below, the limit of type-(Vh, L)’s bid support (Vl, δ1] would be an
empty set due to limp→1 δ1 = Vl. Hence type-(Vh, L) bidder’s best bidding strategy doesn’t
exist given all other types’ bidding strategies. That’s why the tie-breaking rule needs to switch
at q = 1. Under Vickrey tie-breaking rule, type-(Vh, L)’s bid support could be closed interval
[Vl, δ1](the limit of this interval is singleton {Vl} as p→ 1), and any other type bidder’s strategy
does not change. The following argument considers the setting for q ∈ (0, 1), and the same
argument can go through for q = 1 (possibly with some slight modification) by replacing type-
(Vh, L)’s bid support (Vl, δ1] with closed interval [Vl, δ1].
The argument follows several intermediate claims:
Claim 1. Given that the bidder’s opponent follows the provided strategy in the proposition,
the bidder’s best response is the same strategy given in the proposition.
Note that by Lemma 1, it suffices to check the strategies of the bidders with valuation Vh.
We just need to verify that the bidder gets exactly the same expected payoff if she submits any
bid drawn from the support of provided mixed strategy, and that the bidder cannot obtain more
expected payoff by deviation. In other words, the provided strategy is an equilibrium. Since it
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is straightforward, the verification procedure is omitted.
Claim 2. For c < plp2h(Vh− Vl)(2q− 1), there exists no type of symmetric equilibrium other
than the one in part (i) of the proposition.
The argument takes 4 steps.
Step 1: We show that in any symmetric equilibrium, both bidders would choose to acquire
information with positive probability. In other words, we only need to show the case where no
bidder chooses to acquire information is not an equilibrium. Suppose instead, this case can be
an equilibrium. Then it reduces to the standard FPA equilibrium strategy given in part (ii) of
the proposition; that is,
• None of the bidders incurs any cost to receive any signal.
• bi(Vl) = Vl.
• Type-Vh bidder mixes over (Vl, γ] according to cumulative distribution function J¯(·) spec-
ified in (12).
If two bidders follow this strategy, then their surplus under this strategy profile is plph(Vh−
Vl). Now suppose bidder 1 follows the above strategy. Bidder 2 acquires information and adopts
the strategy as follows:
• She acquires information in the first stage.
• bi(Vl) = Vl, b(Vh, L) = Vl + ² and b(Vh, L) = γ.
Her payoff will be given by
ph{[plq + ph(1− q)J¯(Vl + ²)](Vh − Vl − ²) + [pl(1− q) + phq](Vh − γ)} − c
>ph{plq(Vh − Vl − ²) + [pl(1− q) + phq]·(Vh − γ)} − c
=plph(Vh − Vl) + plp2h(2q − 1)(Vh − Vl)− c− plphq².
(34)
Since c < plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1), this deviation is profitable by choosing ² arbitrarily close to
zero. Hence, it cannot be an equilibrium.
Step 2: We show that in any symmetric equilibria type-(Vh, s0), type-(Vh, L), and type-
(Vh,H) bidders should bid in mixed strategies. We show it by way of contradiction.
Suppose the statement is not true, i.e., a type-(Vh, s) s∈{s0, L,H} bidder i bids a fixed
amount b∗ < Vh with probability 1. Then the same type-(Vh, s) bidder j(j 6=i) can deviate to
make more surplus by bidding b∗ + ², where ² is arbitrarily close to zero. This deviation will
lead to a positive jump in type-(Vh, s) bidder j’s winning probability, and hence is profitable.
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Step 3: We prove that in any symmetric mixed strategy equilibria, the supports of J l(·)
and Js0(·) and the supports of Js0(·) and Jh(·) are contiguous and non-overlapping. Note that
the contiguity of supports follows from the same ²-deviation argument.
Now suppose that the supports of J l(·) and Js0(·) overlap over an interval [b1, b2] where
b1 < b2. Mixed strategy requires that the expected surplus be constant for both type-(Vh, L)
and type-(Vh, s0) bidders from any bid b ∈ [b1, b2]. Hence we have that the following equations
hold for some constants C(Vh, s0) and C(Vh, l) :
(Vh − b)
[
pl + phpiE(1− q)J l(b) + ph(1− piE)Js0(b)
]
= C(Vh, s0), (35)
(Vh − b)
[ plq
plq + ph(1− q) +
ph(1− q) · piE(1− q)J l(b)
plq + ph(1− q) +
ph(1− q)(1− piE)Js0(b)
plq + ph(1− q)
]
= C(Vh, l).
(36)
Multiplying equation (35) by (1− q) and equation (36) by −[plq + ph(1− q)], and summing
up, we have
(Vh − b)pl(1− 2q) = (1− q)C(Vh, s0)− [plq + ph(1− q)]C(Vh, l). (37)
Since the right hand side of equation (37) is a constant, this equation cannot hold for any
value of bid b ∈ [b1, b2] for q > 12 . Therefore, the supports for Js0(·) and J l(·) are non-overlapping
in the symmetric equilibrium.
By the same method, if the supports of Js0(·) and Jh(·) overlap over an interval [b′1, b′2] where
b′1 < b′2, then for some constants Cˆ(Vh, s0) and Cˆ(Vh,H), we have
(Vh − b)
[
pl + phpiE(1− q) + ph(1− piE)Js0(b) + phpiEqJh(b)
]
= Cˆ(Vh, s0), (38)
(Vh − b)
[ pl(1− q)
pl(1− q) + phq +
phq · piE(1− q)
pl(1− q) + phq
+
phq(1− piE)Js0(b)
pl(1− q) + phq +
phqpiEJ
h(b)
pl(1− q) + phq
]
= Cˆ(Vh, h).
(39)
Multiplying equation (38) by q and equation (39) by −[pl(1 − q) + phq], and summing up,
we have
(Vh − b)pl(2q − 1) = qCˆ(Vh, s0)− [pl(1− q) + phq]Cˆ(Vh, h). (40)
Again the left hand side of equation (40) is a constant. This equation cannot hold for any
value of bid b ∈ [b′1, b′2] for q > 12 . Therefore, the supports for Js0(·) and Jh(·) are non-overlapping
in the symmetric equilibrium.
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Step 4: Now we show that the support of the type-(Vh, L) bidder should be lower than that
of the type-(Vh, s0) bidder, and the support of the type-(Vh, s0) bidder should be lower than that
of the type-(Vh,H) bidder. Since we have three possible type bidders who use mixed strategies,
there exist six possible rank permutations for the three corresponding supports. We should
rule out all the other five cases13. Now let [Vl, b˜1] be the support of the type-(Vh, s0) bidder’s
mixed strategy with cumulative distribution function (cdf) J˜s0(·). Let [b˜1, b˜2] be the support
of the type-(Vh, L) bidder’s mixed strategy with cdf J˜ l(·), and let [b˜2, b˜3] be the support of the
type-(Vh,H) bidder’s mixed strategy with cdf J˜h(·). Since type-(Vh, L) bidders randomize on
the interval [b˜1, b˜2], their expected surpluses should be constants for any bids drawn from the
interval; that is
(Vh − b)
[
plq
plq + ph(1− q) +
ph(1− q)(1− p˜iE)
plq + ph(1− q) +
ph(1− q)p˜iE(1− q)
plq + ph(1− q) J˜
l(b)
]
=
plq + ph(1− q)(1− p˜iE)
plq + ph(1− q) (Vh − b˜1).
From this equation we can solve for J˜ l(b):
J˜ l(b) =
plq + ph(1− q)(1− p˜iE)
ph(1− q)2p˜iE
b− b˜1
Vh − b . (41)
Assume bidder 1 follows the provided strategy. That is, the type-(Vh, L) bidder 1 randomizes
over [b˜1, b˜2] according to cdf J˜ l(·), the type-(Vh, s0) bidder 1 randomizes over [Vl, b˜1] according
to cdf J˜s0(·), and the type-(Vh,H) bidder 1 randomizes over [b˜2, b˜3] according to cdf J˜h(·). By
submitting bid b ∈ [b˜1, b˜2], the expected surplus for type-(Vh, s0) bidder 2 is given by
(Vh − b)
[
pl + ph(1− p˜iE) + php˜iE(1− q)J˜ l(b)
]
=
(2q − 1)pl
1− q ·b+
[
(pl + ph(1− p˜iE))Vh − plq + ph(1− q)(1− p˜iE)b˜11− q
]
,
which is strictly increasing in b for b ∈ [b˜1, b˜2]. Hence the type-(Vh, s0) bidder has incentive to
deviate while her opponent follows the prescribed strategy. This is a contradiction that means
the supposed case cannot be an equilibrium.
The other four cases can be ruled out using the same method.
Claim 3: There exists no asymmetric equilibrium in which bidder 1 and bidder 2 acquire
information with disparate probabilities.
13Denote S(Vh, s) as the mixed strategy support of type-(Vh, s) bidder where s ∈ {H,L, s0} and ¿ is
interpreted as “lower than.” The five cases are S(Vh, s0)¿S(Vh, l)¿S(Vh, h), S(Vh, s0)¿S(Vh, h)¿S(Vh, l),
S(Vh, l)¿S(Vh, h)¿S(Vh, s0), S(Vh, h)¿S(Vh, l)¿S(Vh, s0), S(Vh, h)¿S(Vh, s0)¿S(Vh, l).
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Suppose there exists such an equilibrium. Denote pˆi1E and pˆi2E as bidder 1 and bidder 2’s
information acquisition probability respectively. Without loss of generality, let pˆi1E > pˆi2E > 0.
The following several steps show that the distribution functions and the parameters satisfy some
necessary conditions imposed by the mixed strategy. Remember that similar arguments can be
used to show that: in an asymmetric equilibrium, the support of type-(Vh, L) bidder i must be
lower than, non-overlapping, and contiguous with that of type-(Vh, s0) bidder i; the support of
type-(Vh, s0) bidder i must be lower than, non-overlapping, and contiguous with that of type-
(Vh,H) bidder i, for i = 1, 2 (refer to Steps 3 and 4 in Claim 2). Then bidder 1 and bidder 2’s
strategies should be as follows:
• Bidder 1 acquires information with probability pˆi1E . The type-(Vh, L) bidder 1 randomizes
over the interval (Vl, bˆ11] according to some cdf Jˆ l1(·), the type-(Vh, s0) bidder 1 randomizes
over the interval [bˆ11, bˆ12] according to some cdf Jˆs01 (·), and the type-(Vh,H) bidder 1
randomizes over the interval [bˆ12, bˆ13] according to some cdf Jˆh1 (·), where Vl < bˆ11 < bˆ12 <
bˆ13 < Vh.
• Bidder 2 acquires information with probability pˆi2E . The type-(Vh, L) bidder 2 randomizes
over the interval (Vl, bˆ21] according to some cdf Jˆ l2(·), the type-(Vh, s0) bidder 2 randomizes
over the interval [bˆ21, bˆ22] according to some cdf Jˆs02 (·), and the type-(Vh,H) bidder 2
randomizes over the interval [bˆ22, bˆ23] according to some cdf Jˆh2 (·), where Vl < bˆ21 < bˆ22 <
bˆ23 < Vh.
Note that the upper bound of the support for type-(Vh,H) bidder 1 and type-(Vh,H) bidder
2 should be the same; that is, bˆ13 = bˆ23 = bˆ3. Then we derive the necessary conditions that pin
down the cumulative distribution functions and the critical parameters.
Step 1: We first show that bˆ11 > bˆ21 and bˆ12 < bˆ22. Suppose instead bˆ11 5 bˆ12. Then both
type-(Vh, L) bidder 1 and type-(Vh, L) bidder 2 should be indifferent between those bids that
belong to the interval (Vl, bˆ11]. By drawing a bid from (Vl, bˆ11], type-(Vh, L) bidder 1’s expected
surplus is given by
(Vh − b)
[
plq
plq + ph(1− q) +
ph(1− q)pˆi2E(1− q)
plq + ph(1− q) Jˆ
l
2(b)
]
=(Vh − Vl) plq
plq + ph(1− q) b = V
+
l
=(Vh − bˆ11)
[
plq
plq + ph(1− q) +
ph(1− q)pˆi2E(1− q)
plq + ph(1− q) Jˆ
l
2(bˆ11)
]
b = bˆ11,
where b = V +l means the bid b approaches Vl from above and the surplus is given at b = V
+
l
by taking the limit as b → Vl, and the meaning of this notation is preserved in the following
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argument. The type-(Vh, L) bidder 2’s expected surplus is given by
(Vh − b)
[
plq
plq + ph(1− q) +
ph(1− q)pˆi1E(1− q)
plq + ph(1− q) Jˆ
l
1(b)
]
=(Vh − Vl) plq
plq + ph(1− q) b = V
+
l
=(Vh − bˆ11)
[
plq
plq + ph(1− q) +
ph(1− q)pˆi1E(1− q)
plq + ph(1− q)
]
b = bˆ11.
From these two equations we get pˆi1E = pˆi2E Jˆ l2(bˆ11), contradicting to the assumption pˆi1E > pˆi2E .
Now suppose bˆ12=bˆ22. Mixed bidding strategy requires that both type-(Vh,H) bidder 1
and type-(Vh,H) bidder 2 should be indifferent between those bids that belong to the interval
[bˆ12, bˆ3]. By drawing a bid from [bˆ12, bˆ3], type-(Vh,H) bidder 1’s expected surplus is given by
(Vh − b)
[
pl(1− q)
pl(1− q) + phq +
phqpˆi2E(1− q)
pl(1− q) + phq +
phq(1− pˆi2E)
pl(1− q) + phq +
phqpˆi2EqJˆ
h
2 (b)
pl(1− q) + phq
]
=(Vh − bˆ12)
[
pl(1− q) + phq(1− qpˆi2E)
pl(1− q) + phq +
phqpˆi2EqJˆ
h
2 (bˆ12)
pl(1− q) + phq
]
b = bˆ12
=Vh − bˆ3 b = bˆ3,
and the type-(Vh,H) bidder 2’s expected surplus is given by
(Vh − b)
[
pl(1− q)
pl(1− q) + phq +
phqpˆi1E(1− q)
pl(1− q) + phq +
phq(1− pˆi1E)
pl(1− q) + phq +
phqpˆi1EqJˆ
h
1 (b)
pl(1− q) + phq
]
=(Vh − bˆ12)
[
pl(1− q) + phq(1− qpˆi1E)
pl(1− q) + phq
]
b = bˆ12
=Vh − bˆ3 b = bˆ3.
From these two equations we obtain pˆi2E − pˆi1E = pˆi1E Jˆh2 (bˆ12) > 0, which contradicts the fact
that pˆi2E < pˆi1E .
Now we have the rank for the extreme points of the supports as Vl < bˆ21 < bˆ11 < bˆ12 < bˆ22 <
bˆ3 < Vh, demonstrated in Figure 6.
Vl Vhbˆ21 bˆ22 bˆ3
Vl Vhbˆ11 bˆ12 bˆ3
Figure 6: Possible Bid Support
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Step 2: Now we consider type-(Vh, L) bidder 1’s surplus. Since she randomizes over the
interval (Vl, bˆ11], her expected surplus is given by
(Vh − b)
[
plq
plq + ph(1− q) +
ph(1− q)pˆi2E(1− q)
plq + ph(1− q) Jˆ
l
2(b) +
ph(1− q)(1− pˆi2E)
plq + ph(1− q) Jˆ
s0
2 (b)
]
=(Vh − Vl) plq
plq + ph(1− q) b = V
+
l
=(Vh − bˆ21)
[
plq + ph(1− q)pˆi2E(1− q)
plq + ph(1− q)
]
b = bˆ21
=(Vh − bˆ11)
[
plq + ph(1− q)pˆi2E(1− q) + ph(1− q)(1− pˆi2E)Jˆs02 (bˆ11)
plq + ph(1− q)
]
b = bˆ11,
which should be a constant for all bids in this interval. By this indifference condition we get
bˆ21 =
plqVl + ph(1− q)2pˆi2EVh
plq + ph(1− q)2pˆi2E ; (42)
Jˆ l2(b) =
plq
ph(1− q)2pˆi2E ·
b− Vl
Vh − b , b ∈ (Vl, bˆ21]; (43)
Jˆs02 (b) =
plq + ph(1− q)2pˆi2E
ph(1− q)(1− pˆi2E) ·
b− bˆ21
Vh − b , b ∈ [bˆ21, bˆ11]. (44)
We turn to the type-(Vh, L) bidder 2. Since she randomizes over the interval (Vl, bˆ12], her
expected surplus is given by
(Vh − b)
[
plq
plq + ph(1− q) +
ph(1− q)pˆi1E(1− q)
plq + ph(1− q) Jˆ
l
1(b)
]
=(Vh − Vl) plq
plq + ph(1− q) b = V
+
l
=(Vh − bˆ21)
[
plq + ph(1− q)pˆi1E(1− q)Jˆ l1(bˆ21)
plq + ph(1− q)
]
b = bˆ21,
which should be a constant for all bids in this interval [Vl, bˆ12]. Since type-(Vh, L) bidder 1 and
type-(Vh, L) bidder 2 have the same payoff according to the above indifference conditions, we
have relation
pˆi2E = pˆi1E Jˆ l1(bˆ21). (45)
Now we turn to the type-(Vh, s0) bidder 2. Since this type bidder 2 randomizes over the
interval [bˆ21, bˆ22], her expected surplus is given by
(Vh − b)
[
pl + phpˆi1E(1− q)Jˆ l1(b) + ph(1− pˆi1E)Jˆs01 (b) + phpˆi1EqJˆh1 (b)
]
=(Vh − bˆ21)
[
pl + phpˆi1E(1− q)Jˆ l1(bˆ21)
]
b = bˆ21
=(Vh − bˆ11)
[
pl + phpˆi1E(1− q)
]
b = bˆ11,
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which should be a constant for all bids in [bˆ21, bˆ22]. Then we have
bˆ11 =
[pl + ph(1− q)pˆi2E ]bˆ21 + ph(1− q)(pˆi1E − pˆi2E)Vh
pl + ph(1− q)pˆi1E . (46)
Step 3: Now we give the conditions that determine the key parameters pˆi1E and pˆi2E . Note
that when bidder 1 or bidder 2 uses a mixed strategy to acquire information, the surplus should
be the same between acquiring information and not acquiring information. Suppose bidder 1
acquires information. With probability ph[plq + ph(1 − q)], bidder 1’s type is (Vh, L) and the
corresponding surplus is plq(Vh−Vl)plq+ph(1−q) . With probability ph[pl(1 − q) + phq] bidder 1’s type is
(Vh,H) and the corresponding surplus is (Vh − bˆ3). The type-Vl bidder has zero surplus. Then
the total surplus is ph
[
(Vh− Vl)plq+ (pl(1− q) + phq)(Vh− bˆ3)
]− c. Now suppose bidder 1 does
not acquire information. With probability ph her type is (Vh, s0) and the corresponding surplus
is (Vh − bˆ11)
[
pl + phpˆi2E(1 − q) + ph(1 − pˆi2E)Jˆs02 (bˆ11)
]
. With probability pl her valuation is Vl
and the corresponding surplus is zero. Then bidder 1’s total non-IA surplus is ph(Vh− bˆ11)
[
pl+
phpˆi2E(1− q) + ph(1− pˆi2E)Jˆs02 (bˆ11)
]
. In equilibrium, it should be true that
ph
[
(Vh − Vl)plq + (pl(1− q) + phq)(Vh − bˆ3)
]− c
= ph(Vh − bˆ11)
[
pl + phpˆi2E(1− q) + ph(1− pˆi2E)Jˆs02 (bˆ11)
]
.
(47)
By the same analysis, we have a similar condition for bidder 2:
ph
[
(Vh − Vl)plq + (pl(1− q) + phq)(Vh − bˆ3)
]− c
= ph(Vh − bˆ21)
[
pl + phpˆi1E(1− q)Jˆ l1(bˆ21)
]
.
(48)
Note that the left hand sides of the two bidders’ indifference conditions are the same and
pˆi2E = pˆi1E Jˆ l1(bˆ21). Then we obtain one necessary condition for pˆi1E and pˆi2E :
pˆi1E(1− q) = pˆi2E(1− q) + (1− pˆi2E)Jˆs02 (bˆ11). (49)
Substituting bˆ11 and Jˆs02 (·) (defined in Step 2) into the equation yields
(pˆi1E − pˆi2E)(1− q) = (pˆi1E − pˆi2E)[plq + ph(1− q)
2pˆi2E ]
pl + ph(1− q)pˆi2E , (50)
which holds only when q = 12 . This contradicts the fact q >
1
2 . Then there exists no such
equilibrium that bidder 1 and bidder 2 acquire information with different probabilities.
Claim 4: It cannot be an equilibrium that one bidder acquires information and the other
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bidder does not acquire information.
By way of contradiction, suppose we can construct such an equilibrium. Without loss of
generality, let bidder 1 choose not to acquire information. Then she will bid Vl if her valuation
is Vl, and mix over the interval (Vl, γ˜] for some constant γ˜ according to some cdf H˜(·). Assume
bidder 2 acquires information with probability p˜i. Then in equilibrium the type-Vl bidder 2 will
bid Vl, the type-(Vh, s0) bidder 2 will mix over the same interval (Vl, γ˜] according to some cdf
H˜s02 , the type-(Vh, L) bidder 2 will mix over the same interval (Vl, γ˜] according to some cdf
H˜ l2, and the type-(Vh,H) bidder 2 will mix over the same interval (Vl, γ˜] according to some cdf
H˜h2 . Note that by Lemma 1, the bidder with valuation Vl bids Vl in any equilibrium, and by
²-deviation argument, the type-Vh bidder should randomize to submit bids over some interval.
Since bidder 2 knows that the type-Vh bidder 1 never bids more than γ˜, the type-Vh bidder 2
also randomizes over the same interval.
By the requirement of mixed strategy, the expected surplus for the type-(Vh, L) bidder 2 and
the type-(Vh,H) bidder 2 must be constant. Hence for some constants C˜l and C˜h, the following
equations should hold, which is impossible unless q = 12 :[
plq
plq + ph(1− q) +
ph(1− q)
plq + ph(1− q) ·H˜1(b)
]
(Vh − b) = C˜l,[
pl(1− q)
pl(1− q) + phq +
phq
pl(1− q) + phq ·H˜1(b)
]
(Vh − b) = C˜h,
for all b ∈ (Vl, γ˜]. Thus we have a contradiction.
Claim 5: There is no asymmetric equilibrium in which two bidders acquire information with
the same probability and submit bids according to different strategies.
Proof. First, similar arguments can be used to show that in an asymmetric equilibrium,
the support of a type-(Vh, L) bidder must be lower than that of a type-(Vh, s0) bidder, and the
support of a type-(Vh, s0) bidder must be lower than that of a type-(Vh,H) bidder (see Step 4
in Claim 2).
Let p˜i be the probability that bidders 1 and 2 acquire information about their opponents’
valuations. Now suppose that the type-(Vh, L) bidder 1 plays a mixed strategy over the support
of (Vl, b˜l1] with c.d.f T˜
l
1(·), and the type-(Vh, L) bidder 2 plays a mixed strategy over the support
of (Vl, b˜l2] with c.d.f T˜
l
2(·). Without loss of generality, assume that b˜l1 > b˜l2. Note that the
type-(Vh, L) bidder 1 is indifferent among all bids in (Vl, b˜l2]. Then T˜
l
2(·) should satisfy
(Vh − b)
[
plq
plq + ph(1− q) +
ph(1− q)p˜i(1− q)T˜ l2(b)
plq + ph(1− q)
]
=(Vh − Vl) plq
plq + ph(1− q) ,
(51)
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from which we obtain
T˜ l2(b) =
plq
ph(1− q)2p˜i ·
b− Vl
Vh − b , (52)
and T˜ l2(b˜
l
2) = 1. Since bidder 2 is also indifferent among all bids in (Vl, b˜
l
2], T˜
l
1(·) should also
satisfy
(Vh − b)
[
plq
plq + ph(1− q) +
ph(1− q)p˜i(1− q)T˜ l1(b)
plq + ph(1− q)
]
=(Vh − Vl) plq
plq + ph(1− q) .
(53)
Then we have
T˜ l1(b) =
plq
ph(1− q)2p˜i ·
b− Vl
Vh − b , (54)
which is exactly the same as T˜ l2(b). Then T˜
l
2(b˜
l
2) = 1, which contradicts the fact that T˜
l
2(b˜
l
2) < 1
for bidder 1 mixes over the interval (Vl, b˜l1]. Hence it should be the case that type-(Vh, L) bidders
1 and 2 both mix in the same interval (Vl, b˜l].
Now suppose that the type-(Vh, s0) bidder 1 mixes over the interval [b˜l, b˜s01 ] according to some
c.d.f. T˜ s01 (·), and the type-(Vh, s0) bidder 2 mixes over the interval [b˜l, b˜s02 ] according to some
c.d.f. T˜ s02 (·). Without loss of generality, assume b˜s01 > b˜s02 . Then by applying the same analysis
above, we will obtain b˜s01 = b˜
s0
2 and T˜
s0
1 (·) = T˜ s02 (·), which in turn implies that the type-(Vh,H)
bidders 1 and 2 will use exactly the same mixed strategies. This completes the claim.
Claim 6: piE is uniquely determined by (11) when 0 5 c < plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1).
Proof. The probability of IA, or the demand for information, piE , is pinned down by bidder’s
indifference condition between IA and no IA. Consider the bidder who acquires information
by incurring cost c. This bidder obtains positive surplus only when her valuation type is Vh
which occurs with probability ph. Conditional on her action of IA, a = 1, the type-Vh bidder
receives a signal L that comes with probability plq + ph(1 − q), or a signal H with probability
pl(1 − q) + phq. In equilibrium, the type-(Vh, L) bidder submits a bid randomly drawn from
(Vl, δ1]. Since any bid in this interval yields type-(Vh, L) bidder the same expected payoff,
suppose she submits a bid with value Vl. This bid wins only against an opponent whose value
is Vl, which occurs with probability
pl(1−q)
pl(1−q)+phq conditional on signal L. Therefore, the type-
(Vh, L) bidder’s expected payoff is S(Vh,L) =
pl(1−q)
pl(1−q)+phq (Vh − Vl). Now turn to the type-(Vh,H)
bidder. Suppose her bid is δ2 (again this bidder submits bid randomly and which bid she submits
wouldn’t matter). The bid δ2 can win against a type-Vl opponent, a type-(Vh, L) opponent and
a type-(Vh, s0) opponent, which occur with probabilities
pl(1−q)
pl(1−q)+phq ,
phqpiE(1−q)
pl(1−q)+phq and
phq(1−piE)
pl(1−q)+phq ,
respectively, conditional on her own type (Vh,H). Therefore, type-(Vh,H) bidder has expected
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payoff S(Vh,H) = (Vh − δ2)[ pl(1−q)pl(1−q)+phq +
phqpiE(1−q)
pl(1−q)+phq +
phq(1−piE)
pl(1−q)+phq ]. The total ex ante expected
payoff then would be ph[(plq + ph(1 − q))S(Vh,L) + (pl(1 − q) + phq)S(Vh,H)] − c, which yields
the left hand side of (11) by simplifying terms. Using the same analysis, the bidder’s expected
payoff without IA can be obtained, which is demonstrated on the right hand side of (11). Since
bidder plays mixed strategy in information acquisition choice, different IA actions must give her
exactly the same expected payoff, hence (11) holds.
Substituting δ1, δ2 and δ3 into (11) and rearranging terms yields the reverse demand for
information
c = plph(Vh − Vl) · plphq(2q − 1)
plq + ph(1− q)2piE ·
(1− piE)
(1− phqpiE) . (55)
The right hand side (RHS) is strictly decreasing in piE , and RHS= plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1)
when piE = 0 and RHS= 0 when piE = 1. Hence, piE is uniquely determined for 05c <
plp
2
h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1) as claimed.
Claim 7: For c = plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1), no bidder acquires information in equilibrium.
Proof. If both bidders acquire information, then both bidders choose the same IA probability
that is implicitly given by (11) according to Claims 3 and 5 and the same reasoning in the
argument of Claim 2, Steps 2 to 4. However, the resulting probability piE given by (11) or
equivalently by (14) is either zero or does not exist for c = plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1). Since Claim
3 implies either both bidders acquire information with positive probability or neither acquires
information in equilibrium, the result follows.
Claim 8: For c = plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1), the equilibrium is symmetric, unique and given
in part (ii) of the proposition.
Proof. When c = plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1), the ex ante IA auction game < AE , GE > is
equivalent to a standard FPA game by Claim 7. By Lemma 1, type-(Vl, s0) bidder bids Vl in
pure strategy. The same reasoning as in the argument of Step 2, Claim 2 shows that type-(Vh, s0)
bidder plays mixed strategy. Obviously, the supports of the type-(Vh, s0) bidders 1 and 2 are the
same, namely, (Vl, γ] for some Vl < γ < Vh, since they just consider winning against each other
(they win against type-(Vl, s0) opponent for sure). The indifference condition that requires any
bid drawn on the support yield the same expected surplus will pin down the parameter γ and
c.d.f.J¯(·), as given in (13) and (12), respectively. This implies the equilibrium is unique and
symmetric.
The series of Claims 1 to 8 together with Lemma 1 imply that the equilibrium of the game
< AE , GE > is unique and symmetric, and fully characterized in the proposition. The proof of
the proposition now is complete. 
39
Proof of Corollary 1: Part (i). For c ∈ [0, plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1)), we know piE is continuous
and decreasing in c, and piE goes to zero as c approaches plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1) from equation
(14). Also from part (ii) of Proposition 1, piE = 0 for c ∈ [plp2h(Vh−Vl)(2q−1),+∞). The result
then follows.
Part (ii). For c = 0, piE = 1 for all q ∈ (0.5, 1] since piE is determined by (14). For
0 < c < plp2h(Vh − Vl), there are two cases to consider. If 0.5 < q 5 12 [1 + cplp2h(Vh−Vl) ], then
piE = 0 by part (ii) of Proposition 1. If 12 [1+
c
plp
2
h(Vh−Vl)
] < q 5 1, then piE > 0 and is determined
by (14). Let B1 =
q(2q−1)
plq+phpiE(1−q)2 , and B2 =
1−piE
1−phqpiE . It is easy to see that both B1 and B2 are
increasing in q and decreasing in piE . Therefore, the right hand side of (14) is increasing in q
and decreasing in piE . Since the left hand side of (14) does not depend on q, we can conclude
that piE is increasing in accuracy q for 12 [1 +
c
plp
2
h(Vh−Vl)
] < q 5 1. For c = plp2h(Vh − Vl), we
simply have piE = 0 by part (ii) of Proposition 1. Hence the conclusion follows. 
Proof of Proposition 2. All procedures of the proof are exactly parallel to those of Proposition
1. The only difference is that the bidder with valuation Vl will always choose not to acquire
information since she cannot benefit from it. Note that type-Vl bidder completely ignores the
signal if she acquires information in ex ante IA equilibrium. This indifference also implies the
equation that determines piI now turns to be the indifference condition for type-Vh bidder. We
do not intend to replicate the argument, hence omit the proof. 
Proof of Corollary 2: Part (i). For c < plph(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1), piI is given by equation (24);
therefore, it is obvious that piI is strictly decreasing in c and limc↗plph(Vh−Vl)(2q−1) piI = 0. For
c = plph(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1), piI = 0 by part (ii) of Proposition 2. Hence, piI is continuous in c.
Part (ii). It’s self-evident that piI = 1 when c = 0 from (24). When plph(Vh − Vl) > c > 0,
there are two different ranges of q to consider. If 0.5 < q 5 12 [1 +
c
plph(Vh−Vl) ], piI = 0 by part
(ii) of Proposition 2. If 12 [1 +
c
plph(Vh−Vl) ] < q 5 1, piI > 0 and piI is characterized by (24).
Let Bˆ1 =
plq(2q−1)
plq+ph(1−q)2piI and Bˆ2 =
(1−piI)
(1−phqpiI) . It is easy to figure out that both Bˆ1 and Bˆ2 are
strictly increasing in q and strictly decreasing in piI . Therefore, the right hand side of (24) is
strictly increasing in q and strictly decreasing in piI , which implies piI increases as q goes up for
1
2 [1+
c
plph(Vh−Vl) ] < q 5 1. When c = plph(Vh−Vl), obviously piI = 0 by part (ii) of Proposition
2.
Part (iii). We define a function of pi as
φ(pi) = p2l p
2
h(Vh − Vl)q(2q − 1) ·
1− pi
[plq + ph(1− q)2pi](1− phqpi) , (56)
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which is decreasing in pi. Actually this function is the right hand side of (14). Then we have
φ(piE) =
c
ph
> c = φ(piI); (57)
hence 0 < piE < piI for 0 < c < plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1). When plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1) 5 c <
plph(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1), it is easy to see piI > 0 = piE . This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Part (i) follows directly from (25), noting that piE = 0 and
q ∈ (0.5, 1]. Part (ii) follows from the result that piE is decreasing in c by Corollary 1 and the
fact that SE is increasing in piE for q ∈ (0.5, 1).
Proof of Proposition 4. Part (i) is self evident, since piE > 0 for the given ranges of c and q
by Proposition 1.
Part (ii). First for c < plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1), piE is characterized by equation (14), and
differentiating both sides with respect to c and rearranging terms yields
∂piE
∂c
= − [plq + ph(1− q)
2piE ]2[1− phqpiE ]2
p2l p
2
h(Vh − Vl)q(2q − 1)
[
ph(1− q)2(1− piE)(1− phqpiE) + (1− phq)(plq + ph(1− q)2piE)
] .
(58)
Therefore, simple algebra shows that
∂TSE
∂c
= −2(piE + c · ∂piE
∂c
)
= −2 · ph[ph(1− q)
3 − pl(2q − 1)]pi2E + 2plqpiE − plq[
ph(1− q)2(1− piE)(1− phqpiE) + (1− phq)(plq + ph(1− q)2piE)
] (59)
where the second line follows by substituting c and ∂piE∂c using (14) and (58), respectively.
Let the numerator be N(piE) = ph[ph(1 − q)3 − pl(2q − 1)]pi2E + 2plqpiE − plq. N(·) has the
properties that N(0) = −plq < 0, N(1) = p2h(1− q)3+ pl[q− ph(2q− 1)] > 0, and N(·) is strictly
increasing in piE for piE ∈ [0, 1] regardless of the sign of [ph(1− q)3− pl(2q− 1)]. The increasing
property can be seen as follows. If ph(1− q)3− pl(2q− 1) = 0, then N(·) is obviously increasing
in piE . If ph(1− q)3 − pl(2q − 1) < 0, then N(·) is a quadratic function of piE and is increasing
in piE for piE < − 2plq2ph[ph(1−q)3−pl(2q−1)] ; note that −
2plq
2ph[ph(1−q)3−pl(2q−1)] >
2plq
2plph(2q−1) > 1, hence
N(·) is increasing for piE ∈ [0, 1]. If ph(1− q)3−pl(2q−1) > 0, then the increasing range of N(·)
would be piE > − 2plq2ph[ph(1−q)3−pl(2q−1)] , which includes the interval [0, 1]. Then, N(·) is strictly
increasing for piE ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, there exists a unique critical value pˆiE ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂TSE∂c < 0 for piE ∈ [0, pˆiE)
and ∂TS
E
∂c > 0 for piE ∈ [pˆiE , 1]. By Corollary 1, piE is strictly decreasing in c and is uniquely
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determined by equation (14), then the result follows by setting cETS(q) = φ(pˆiE), where φ(·) is
defined in (56).
Part (iii). By Corollary 1 item (ii), piE is weakly increasing in q, then it follows that TSE is
weakly decreasing in accuracy. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Part (i). Since piEc = 0, and SE = S0 by Proposition 3 part (i),
the result follows.
Part (ii). Simple algebra shows that
dχE
dc
= −2
[
piE +
(
c+
∂SE
∂piE
)
· ∂piE
∂c
]
= −2
{
piE +
[
c+ p2l p
2
h(Vh − Vl)
q(1− q)(2q − 1)
[plq + ph(1− q)2piE ]2
]
· ∂piE
∂c
}
.
Using (14) and (58) to substitute c and ∂piE∂c yields
dχE
dc
= 2
(1− phq)
[
ph(2q − 1)pi2E − 2qpiE + 1
]
ph(1− q)2(1− piE)(1− phqpiE) + (1− phq)(plq + ph(1− q)2piE) .
(60)
Therefore, the sign of dχ
E
dc is the same as the term ξ(piE) = [ph(2q− 1)pi2E − 2qpiE +1]. It is easy
to see ξ(piE) > 0 for piE ∈ [0, pi∗E) and ξ(piE) < 0 for piE ∈ (pi∗E , 1] where pi∗E = q−
√
q2−2phq+ph
ph(2q−1) ∈
(0, 1). Define the critical value cE(q) = φ(pi∗E), where φ(·) is given by (56). Then cE(q) ∈
(0, plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1)) as piE ∈ (0, 1).
Since piE is a strictly decreasing function of c when c ∈ [0, plp2h(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1)], we have
ξ(piE) > 0 for c ∈ (cE(q), plp2h(Vh−Vl)(2q− 1)] and ξ(piE) < 0 for c ∈ [0, cE(q)). Then the result
of Part (ii) follows. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Part (i) follows from the fact that piI is increasing in piI and piI is
decreasing in c by Corollary 2.
Part (ii). Note that piI = piE implies SI = SE , and piI > piE and q ∈ (0, 5, 1) imply
SI > SE . For q ∈ (0.5, 1) and 0 < c < plph(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1), piI > piE by Corollary 2. Then
the strict inequality follows. We also know that piI = piE = 1 for c = 0 and piI = piE = 0 for
c = plph(Vh − Vl)(2q − 1) according to Propositions 1 and 2, then piI = piE holds. Part (ii)
follows. 
Proof of Proposition 7. The argument is parallel to that of Proposition 4, hence is omitted.
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Proof of Proposition 8. The argument is parallel to that of Proposition 5, hence is omitted.
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